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Before looking to enter a cloud-based market, weigh industry characteristics and 
one’s own stock of design capital.  
 
(figure)  The seven building blocks of a cloud-hosted SaaS business strategy 
  
(table) The building blocks of a cloud business strategy as reflected in three cases.  
 
key insights  
* Motivated by the hype around providing application software via the cloud, many firms 
approach the cloud without a clear strategy, often resulting in disappointment.  
* Deciding to offer cloud-based software must be part of a broader digital strategy 
informed by the industry characteristics in which a firm operates, as well as by the firm’s 
existing stock of internal systems and processes, also known as its “design capital.”  
* A cloud strategy must also account for customers’ views and concerns with cloud-
based SaaS, particularly demand for security optimization and software customization. 
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Cloud computing refers to an on-demand network service that allows individual users or 
businesses to access configurable resources. It can also be defined as an on-demand 
delivery model enabling the synchronized delivery of computing resources (such as 
applications, storage, servers, networks, and services).[2] As it stands, there are three 
cloud computing delivery models: software as a service (SaaS), as in Salesforce.com and 
Google apps, delivering applications to end users over a network; platform as a service 
(PaaS), as in the Google app engine and Microsoft Azure, deploying applications to a 
cloud; and infrastructure as a service (IaaS), as in the Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud, 
renting storage, processing, and network capacity to host applications. Of the three, the 
SaaS model has gained the greatest momentum, given its economically efficient 
foundations and ability to satisfy user preferences for the ubiquitous availability of data 
and applications.[1]  
 
From the perspective of application software providers, the SaaS model offers the 
obvious benefit of liberating them from the traditional low-level tasks involved in setting 
up IT infrastructures and deploying applications to client machines.[4] Providers are thus 
able to scale their investment with a view to growing their businesses,[9] focusing on 
innovation and creating business value.[7] Accordingly, cloud computing has been 
associated with other benefits that  arise due to offering a controlled interface, a virtual 
business environment, increased addressability and traceability, and rapid elasticity and 
scalability.[5]  
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It is easy to understand why application software providers face increasing pressure to 
jump into the cloud and exchange their on-site application software for cloud-based 
solutions. However, the unfortunate reality is that most of the promised benefits have 
turned out to be a triumph of hype over reality. A 2013 Forbes article noted many firms 
are following a “no-strategy” approach in moving to the cloud, leading more often to 
failure than success;[8] for example, Adobe’s Creative Cloud product line has been 
impeded by the skepticism of customers not yet ready to move to subscription-based 
services; concerns include file recovery in the event of a subscription lapse, and the need 
for more-tailored offerings for photography enthusiasts.[10]  
 
As we aim to show here, there is a clear need for business managers to better understand 
the fundamental underpinnings of a successful cloud-based SaaS strategy (henceforth 
cloud strategy), which is defined as a “set of decisions required to create and deploy a 
network-based, information-service-delivery strategy that results in both cost savings and 
organizational agility.”[5] A successful cloud strategy must encompass some of the key 
elements distinguishing a broader digital business strategy. These elements include a 
series of higher-order dimensions relating to the characteristics of a firm’s respective 
industry and its existing stock of internal technological capabilities. Moreover, we show 
that complementing these dimensions with certain attributes of cloud technology related 
to the actual application software leads to the formation of distinct cloud strategies.  
 
Components  
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A digital business strategy can broadly be understood as the means through which a firm 
engages in any category of IT activity; the strategic nature of this engagement implies the 
“dynamic synchronization between business and IT to gain competitive advantage.”[6] 
Recent studies have identified more specific elements of a digital business strategy, 
examples of which include a firm’s digital strategic posture[6] and the design-based 
dimension of a digital business strategy.[11]  
 
The digital strategic posture is defined as a firm’s degree of engagement in a particular 
digital business practice relative to the industry norm.[6] The degree to which a firm 
chooses to diverge from or converge on the industry norm in its ongoing digital business 
strategy is influenced by the interaction between its current digital strategic posture and 
three key elements of its industry environment: turbulence, concentration, and growth.[6] 
These elements are defined as follows: Industry turbulence is the rate at which a firm 
enters and exits an industry; concentration is the extent of competitive rivalry in an 
industry; and growth is the rate of increase in demand for the industry’s output.[6] Mithas 
et al.[6] proposed that strong industry turbulence, low industry concentration, and low 
industry growth influence firms to develop digital business strategies that diverge from 
industry norms due to intense competition and the fact such norms are less reliable guides 
of future success.[6] In contrast, the same authors argue that low industry turbulence, 
high industry concentration, and high industry growth influence firms to develop digital 
business strategies that converge on industry norms, as these norms are reliable indicators 
of the possible success of particular strategic moves.[6]  
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As opposed to looking at external factors, Woodard et al.[11] proposed the design-based 
logic of a digital business strategy that examines a firm’s internal systems and processes, 
or its “design capital.” Design capital includes the firm’s option value, or the breadth of 
opportunities afforded by its internal systems and processes, and technical debt, or 
expected cost or effort to exercise those opportunities.[11] Woodard et al.[11] further 
proposed that a digital business strategy should aim to manage the levels of option value 
and technical debt associated with a firm’s design capital toward the ideal state of high-
quality design capital characterized by high option value and low technical debt. This 
ideal state allows a firm to seize a range of market opportunities and respond to 
competitors’ actions with speed and scale.[11]  
 
Although a digital strategy is not synonymous with a cloud strategy, insights from these 
higher-level frameworks arguably serve as a useful foundation for better understanding 
how firms approach the cloud. This conviction stems from the fact that a cloud strategy is 
inherently embedded in a broader digital strategy, and also from the fact that the industry 
environment and a firm’s internal capabilities are the main determinants of a firm’s 
competitive strategy.[6,11] We draw empirical support for this insight by analyzing 
recent strategic decisions to offer cloud-based application software made by three firms.  
 
Case Analysis  
All three firms are located in the same European country but operate in different 
industries. Firm 1 is a telecommunications provider; Firm 2 is a small engineering-
simulation-software provider; and Firm 3 is a mid-size company specializing in customer 
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relationship management (CRM) software. While it may take a while before one can 
conclude whether these companies’ cloud strategies will ultimately be successful or not, 
by synthesizing the analyses of the three at the point they made their decisions, we 
contribute to both researcher and practitioner understanding of the different parameters 
firms must take into account when unfolding a cloud strategy.  
 
Major telecommunications provider. Firm 1 is a large telecommunication provider 
serving both residential and business customers. The telecommunication industry is 
characterized by a high degree of industry turbulence, where there are frequent entries 
and exits of firms from different industries (such as those in the mobile applications 
industry offering customers cheaper alternatives for long-distance calls), high industry 
concentration (generally, only a few telecommunication providers compete in a given 
country, three in the country where Firm 1 operates), and high industry growth (demand 
for improved connectivity and speed are constantly increasing). In this environment, it is 
not immediately clear whether a firm’s digital business strategy should diverge from or 
converge on the telecommunications industry norm, supplementing traditional offerings 
(such as voice calls and data offerings) with relatively nontraditional arrangements (such 
as mobile payments) by collaborating with firms in other industries (such as financial 
services).  
 
An assessment of Firm 1’s internal systems and processes (digital capital) positions the 
firm in the debt-constrained design capital state, or high option value and high technical 
debt.[11] While its telecommunication infrastructure appears to give it plenty of options 
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for entering the cloud business, significant investment is needed to make it IaaS-ready, as 
a recent a 2012?? report stated, “We thoroughly discussed with [our] cloud architects … 
about the IaaS. Their response was positive, but it would be very expensive … ” In such a 
debt-constrained state, depending on the level of its resource munificence, the firm will 
need to either abandon the option or reduce its debt.[11] Debt-constrained firms with 
access to abundant resources, as with Firm 1, can afford to reduce their debt without 
abandoning their strategic options.  
 
Considering other cloud-computing delivery models besides IaaS, Firm 1 decided to 
invest in developing its own cloud infrastructure, as well as new business models offering 
various SaaS -based products to end users (in this case, business users) instead of offering 
IaaS-based products to application service providers. Leveraging its current position as a 
trusted telecommunications provider and the well-known data-protection policy of the 
country in which it operates, Firm 1 targets enterprises operating in high security-loss 
environments with highly critical SaaS security optimization. The main value proposition 
Firm 1 offers to these enterprises is the security of their data, as the data does not leave 
the country (the cloud farms are located in the country where Firm 1 operates), and the 
security of their data processing, as the SaaS -based products will be hosted locally by 
Firm 1 itself.  
 
Part of Firm 1’s initiative is to collaborate with a CRM software provider to provide 
CRM SaaS to business customers. It is important to note that besides the existing 
enterprises the focal CRM provider serves, the immediate target customers of Firm 1 are 
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mid- and large-size financial enterprises in the country that are current subscribers to its 
telecommunications network. These financial enterprises are working in high security-
loss environments and are likely to suffer major economic losses if the CRM system is 
subject to security attacks.[1]  
 
However, the specific nature of the CRM SaaS, which supports multi-tenancy with high 
parameterization or customization, is technically very complex and can be very 
expensive. According to the firm’s CRM corporate collaborators, their CRM software 
does not support multi-tenancy, because each client (tenant) tends to require system 
parameterization; that is, “ … customers that buy the CRM software usually demand a 
customized system according to their business processes and therefore the support of 
multi-tenancy with high parameterization is technically very complex and expensive” 
(excerpt from our communication with a business development manager in Firm 1). This 
situation is a good example of how a firm’s digital capital is intertwined with its client’s 
technical needs, in this case, support for multi-tenancy with high parameterization. 
Having access to technical resources, Firm 1 is able to find a secure cost-effective 
solution to the multi-tenancy challenge of providing highly customized systems by 
deploying multiple software instances for different tenants at a single server; the client 
can thus achieve software customization while still enjoying the benefits of a cloud-based 
service.  
 
As it turned out, Firm 1 decided to diverge from the industry norm; instead of offering 
the usual telecommunication infrastructure-related offerings, it aimed to offer SaaS to 
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business customers, thus altering its position in the current industry ecosystem from 
being a telecommunications provider to SaaS provider. Its new position as a SaaS 
provider will enable Firm 1 to enjoy multiple benefits “ … as it enables vertical selling 
opportunities in addition to the license fees such as iPads [rental] and voice and data 
subscriptions … ” (excerpt from an internal Firm 1 report). At the moment, “ … the 
infrastructure to host the SaaS is an ongoing work and expected to be available by early 
2016 … there is [still] a high business interest to start this SaaS project … within the next 
year” (excerpt from our communication with a business development manager in Firm 1).  
 
Engineering-simulation-software provider. Our second case is a small provider of 
engineering simulation software specializing in computational fluid dynamics and 
multiphase flow heat transfers. Its software is sold globally and used mainly by research 
organizations and companies in the oil and gas industry, nuclear engineering, renewable 
energies, microfluidics, and advanced materials science (hereafter referred to as “client 
companies”). The client companies’ use of this advanced software is limited by their 
access to computing power; only a few clients have the computational resources (parallel 
computers or clusters) required to run very demanding simulations, thus shrinking the 
size of the engineering simulation software market and contributing to low industry 
growth.  
 
The competition for this already small market is fierce and dominated by two large 
companies, thus characterized by high industry concentration. “Unlike [the] commodity 
[software] market, the engineering simulation [software] market is highly oriented toward 
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a “ … dominant design. This means the incumbents try to make their competitors 
obsolete by locking their customers into their software logic [and algorithms] … ” 
(excerpt from an internal Firm 2 report). Although the software logic and algorithm may 
not be the most efficient (or even the most appropriate), client companies will incur high 
switching costs if they change from one software provider to another due to 
organizational latency, training, know-how transfer, and learning curves. This is a strong 
indication of low industry turbulence, as it is difficult for firms from different sectors to 
enter and exit the industry. To sustain itself in this small yet highly competitive market, 
Firm 2 also offers consultancy services. In this environment of low turbulence, high 
concentration, and low growth, it is not immediately clear whether its digital business 
strategy should converge on or diverge from the engineering simulation industry norm, 
implying (for small providers) the need to heavily supplement their software offerings 
with consultancy services. However, Firm 2 recognizes that providing a consultancy 
service is not as scalable as its software offering and thus (although it is the industry 
norm) may not be a sustainable strategy in the long run. As the founder of Firm 2 said in 
an interview with us, “[The consultancy service] is very labor intensive.” Hence, the 
tendency is to follow a business strategy that diverges from the industry norm.  
 
In terms of its digital capital, Firm 2 is in the low-quality design capital state, or low 
option value and high technical debt.[11] Such a firm, depending on its level of resource 
abundance and technical capability, can aim to either reduce its technical debt or create 
different value options.[11] By default, Firm 2 is constrained by a lack of resources but at 
the same time enjoys a strong relationship with academic stakeholders. As the founder of 
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Firm 2 told us, “We are working closely with a research institute in a local university,” 
thus enabling Firm 2 to exit a low-quality state by increasing its technical capabilities.  
 
Since the market is small, not very adaptable, and dominated by two large companies, 
Firm 2 is considering (with the aid of its academic contacts) deploying its software as a 
cloud computing hosted service. Firm 2 also reported “Companies on the edge of starting 
engineering simulation activities are not willing to invest in IT infrastructure acquisition 
and long term maintenance contracts. They rather [tend to] spread [their] investment over 
time, much like any other operation consumable. Furthermore yearly software license 
fees constitute a financial burden, especially when the software vendor enjoys a quasi-
monopoly situation. [In this context] cloud computing appears … [to be] a real alternative 
answer to engineering needs … ” (excerpt from an internal Firm 2 report). Since the 
engineering data is not sensitive and the simulation process need not be performed in a 
highly secure environment, the cloud-hosted SaaS solution seems to be a viable way for 
Firm 2 to compete with the dominant players in the current market and help increase its 
market share.  
 
Firm 2 realized the high switching costs associated with its product offering implies the 
decision as to which simulation software to adopt is in the hands of client companies’ top 
managers, who may not be familiar with algorithms and simulation-software logics. For 
their engineers to use inefficient software on daily basis could thus be frustrating. With a 
Web-based cloud-computing hosted service, Firm 2 is able to invite these engineers to 
test their software during a free trial period, without having to access or use their 
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companies’ own computational resources. Firm 2’s aim is to allow the engineers who are 
the real users of the simulation software to use it and test its efficiency and accuracy in a 
cloud environment, hoping they can then convince their top management to switch to 
Firm 2’s software.  
 
The switching cost from on-premise software to a cloud-computing hosted service is 
marginal. Moreover, since the cloud-based simulation software is meant to allow 
virtually anyone to perform highly demanding engineering simulations, with no 
infrastructure prerequisites, Firm 2 intends to increase its share of the target market 
beyond that of the large companies with computational resources in place. Firm 2 is 
currently working with a cloud broker and a cloud infrastructure provider to implement 
its cloud-based solution and bring its software to the cloud. Firm 2 intends to “ … use it 
exactly in the same way as planned: it will lock new customers by offering them trial 
access without software installation … ” (excerpt from an internal Firm 2 report). 
 
CRM software provider. Firm 3 is a mid-size software company specializing in CRM 
software. Firm 3 reports “[The CRM software] is available as fat client: it has iPhone and 
iPad applications and also has a Web front-end. This allows customers to flexibly use the 
front-end that is most suitable for their processes. [For example], sales personnel can use 
the iPad version to be fully mobile while being with the customer, so a call center agent 
can use the fat client perfectly optimized for his tasks … ” (excerpt from a from an 
internal Firm 3 report). Our analysis of Firm 3’s industry environment is as follows. The 
CRM software industry is characterized by low industry turbulence (where firms’ entries 
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and exits from different industries are less frequent), high industry concentration (few 
well-known CRM software providers), and high industry growth (increased demand for 
CRM software, especially from small- and mid-size companies). In this environment, the 
literature predicts Firm 3’s digital business strategy should converge on the industry 
norm, because it is relatively easy to clearly determine the optimal level of IT investment 
and its potential for success.[6] The industry norm for firms like Firm 3 that offer on-
premise CRM software is to supplement this traditional offering with the SaaS version of 
CRM software. As our conceptual framework would predict, Firm 3 indeed views cloud 
computing as a new opportunity that could extend its business and thus plans to provide 
the SaaS version of its CRM software, offering it alongside the on-premises version. Firm 
3 says, “As the current [on-premises] CRM version already fulfils the main 
characteristics of online access with multiple devices, no local data storage, and 
scalability, the private offering can mainly be seen as a marketing enhancement … ” 
(excerpt from an internal Firm 3 report).  
 
Our own assessment of Firm 3’s internal systems and processes (digital capital) positions 
Firm 3 in the debt-constraint design capital state sector (high option value and high 
technical debt[11]). A significant investment is required to produce the SaaS version of 
the software, and there is internal Firm 3 concern about going in this direction, as the 
following excerpt from a Firm 3 report indicates: “The question of whether the CRM 
[software] should be offered in the cloud or not is omnipresent. This dilemma involves 
various factors. As [the company] is not a big software producer, this dilemma needs to 
be taken seriously, as [the required] financial investment can hardly be covered in case of 
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a failure.” In such a debt-constrained state, Firm 3 should either abandon the option or 
reduce its debt, depending on the level of its resource munificence.[11] Firm 3 
recognized that the significant resources needed to develop the SaaS version of its 
software is a strategic necessity, as it said in an internal report “ … there is not only the 
question whether it is worth to invest into a cloud solution, but also whether it is possible 
for [the company] to survive in the long run without a cloud solution … ” As noted 
earlier, the current industry norm is for CRM software providers to offer a cloud solution, 
“… the topic is brought up [in the company] as the customers start asking for it” (excerpt 
from a Firm 3 email memo).  
 
Understanding an aggressive move to compete with the big providers of CRM SaaS 
would be quite difficult and most likely lead to a price war, Firm 3 sought to identify a 
number of unique selling propositions that were difficult for its competitors to imitate 
before moving to the cloud. Specifically, it saw a regional advantage, a legal advantage 
(storing customers’ data according to country-specific-laws), and a know-how advantage 
(about a specific security algorithm). These unique selling propositions stem from the 
fact that the business users who work with client data are in high-security-loss 
environments and face considerable economic loss if the CRM system would suffer a 
security attack,[1] as well as from the fact that Firm 3 has already built significant levels 
of personal trust with its clients.  
 
Firm 3 mainly serves customers in its home country and a customer base consisting 
mainly of large organizations in various industries, especially in the retail, 
15 
pharmaceutical, and insurance sectors. With selling propositions in mind, Firm 3 decided 
against a public cloud offering, as it saw a number of constraints that would disrupt its 
existing business model, beyond even its in-depth, personal relationships with all of its 
customers. Shifting to a public cloud offering would also imply a cultural change within 
the company that would be difficult to achieve. Firm 3 opted instead for a private cloud 
solution, as it would be largely compatible with its existing personalized services. This 
new offering might attract new customers that do not want to operate the application 
themselves but do want their own private application. The only constraint in this case was 
the lack of a data center where the application could be hosted. As running such a data 
center is not its core business, Firm 3 decided to outsource the task to a well-known 
provider that could ensure the scalability and, more important, the security demanded by 
its customers.  
 
Insights  
Analyzing these cases, we reached two main conclusions. First, in addition to the five 
building blocks related to the external environment and a firms’ broader internal digital 
capabilities, all three firms had to account for certain requirements of their customers 
with respect to cloud technology before deciding how to approach them with a cloud-
based SaaS offering. In particular, we found customers’ requirements involving software 
security and customization are the two main attributes that determine a firm’s decision to 
change its on-premise software to cloud-based SaaS. The criticality of security 
optimization depends on whether target users are working in high- or low-security-loss 
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environments,[1] whereas the importance of software customization depends on the type 
of software being offered.  
 
Second, we found the three firms developed three different strategies in terms of utilizing 
the cloud to compete in their industries, as well as their value propositions. In our 
empirical examples, Firm 1 can be seen as an innovator, Firm 2 as a disruptor, and Firm 3 
as an optimizer. We define innovators as firms offering cloud-based application software 
to create new revenue streams by moving into an adjacent ecosystem or marketplace. In 
the course of this extension and transformation, innovators often have a chance to 
combine elements of the value propositions and value chains that were previously 
unrelated, and so increase their competitive advantage.[3] The cloud is not only a 
technology that enables businesses to embrace opportunities for innovation,[3] it also 
serves as a catalyst for business-model transformation.  
 
Unlike innovator strategies, companies classified as having disruptive strategies share the 
perception that cloud-based application software offerings can generate completely 
different value chains. We define disruptors as firms that either radically reformulate 
customer value propositions or generate new customer needs in their current ecosystems. 
Disruptors have the potential to capture inimitable competitive advantage by creating 
disruptive mechanisms in existing markets or industries. Such firms typically provide 
customers with what they either were unaware of or did not realize they needed. While 
businesses using this model face greater risk, they also tend to gain higher rewards. Cloud 
computing enables the radical transformation of existing markets or industries by 
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enabling businesses to be more agile and adopt technology-integrated business strategies 
in place of technology strategies based on business strategies.[3]  
 
We define optimizers as firms drawing advantage from cloud computing to improve their 
existing customer value propositions within their existing ecosystems. Optimizers can 
expand their value propositions by offering enhanced products and services, improved 
customer experience, and/or more extensive channel-delivery options;[3] they also tend 
to be more risk-averse than innovators and disruptors. By supporting fast experimental 
implementation of new application software offerings without need for substantial 
upfront costs, cloud computing drives improvement across an optimizer’s value 
propositions and value chains.  
 
Important to note is that adopted strategies are contingent on the configuration of the 
focal firms with respect to the initial five building blocks, as well as the remaining two 
blocks related to their target clients’ requirements of the application software through the 
cloud. The figure here outlines the seven building blocks that largely determine whether a 
firm should use cloud computing to innovate, disrupt, or optimize its business model. The 
first five are derived from the two frameworks of digital business strategy we discussed 
earlier, namely those of digital strategic posture[6] and design-based logic of digital 
business strategy.[11] The remaining two, or the criticality of security optimization and 
demand for software customization, emerge from the cases and refer to clients’ 
requirements with respect to a cloud-based SaaS offering. These two attributes of the 
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software appear to complement the broader categories of a firm’s industry environments 
and digital capital.  
 
The first three building blocks, which we categorize as the characteristics of the industry 
in which a firm operates, include the degree of turbulence, concentration, and growth rate 
of the industry.[6] It has been established that high (low) industry turbulence, low (high) 
industry concentration, and low (high) industry growth would influence a firm to develop 
a digital business strategy that diverges from (converges to) industry norms.[6] In our 
three empirical examples, we observed two scenarios. In one, Firm 3 operates in an 
industry with low turbulence, high industry concentration, and high industry growth, and 
so has designed a digital business strategy that converges to the industry norm to 
optimize its existing software offering by adding a SaaS version of the software. Firm 3 
imitates what happens in its industry without much innovation or attempt to disrupt 
industry norms. In the other, Firm 1 operates in an industry distinguished by high 
turbulence, high concentration, and high growth, whereas Firm 2 is in an industry 
characterized by low turbulence, high concentration, and low growth. For these two 
firms, it is not immediately clear whether they should diverge from or converge on their 
respective industry norms with regard to developing cloud-related strategies.  
 
The next two building blocks—option value and technical debt—refer to firms’ design 
capital (in terms of internal systems and processes).[11] While Firm 1 is in the debt-
constrained design capital state (high option value and high technical debt), Firm 2 is in 
the low-quality design capital state (low option value and high technical debt[11]), but its 
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close relationships with local academic institutions and researchers enables it to escape a 
low-quality state by accessing the technical capabilities it needs from these institutions. 
Leveraging its current position as a trusted telecommunication provider and the well-
regarded data-protection policy of the country in which it operates, Firm 1 decided to 
invest considerable resources to innovate and alter its position in its industry ecosystem, 
from telecommunications infrastructure provider to SaaS provider specializing in 
servicing business users in high-security-loss environments, meaning Firm 1 is diverging 
from its industry norm.  
 
Unlike Firm 1, which also diverges from its industry’s norm, Firm 2 hopes it will disrupt 
the operations of the current industry players by offering SaaS for engineering simulation 
instead of innovating by establishing a new revenue stream through a cloud-based 
offering. It considers this a radical solution that will allow it to disrupt the current top-
down nature of its clients’ decision making about engineering-simulation software, and 
thus break through the dominant market players. By offering a Web-based cloud-
computing hosted service, Firm 2 can invite its potential customers’ engineers—the 
ultimate users of its software—to test it during a free trial period without them needing to 
access or use their own companies’ computational resources; it hopes these engineers will 
then convince top management in their organizations to adopt its software.  
 
There are two main reasons for this apparent difference in the strategies of Firm 1and 
Firm 2. First, engineering-related data for simulation purposes does not need security 
optimization; neither the storage nor the processing of the data has to be fully secured. 
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This makes it easy for Firm 2 to disrupt the market by inviting the engineers who they 
hope will be their software’s ultimate users to test it by uploading engineering-related 
data to the cloud, avoiding having to access or use their organizations’ own 
computational resources to test the software. It would be difficult to disrupt the current 
market through a free trial of a Web-based cloud-computing-hosted service if demand for 
data-security optimization was high. And second, the software offered by Firm 2 need not 
cater to users’ demand for software customization. Engineering-simulation software has a 
specific logic and algorithms that are relevant for each engineer using it. A less-critical 
security optimization and a low demand for software customization ultimately drive Firm 
2’s attempt to grow its market share by adopting a disruptive cloud strategy.  
 
Even though the attributes of the industry environment seem to be the main driver of 
Firm 3’s cloud strategy, our analysis of its clients’ demand for security optimization and 
customization complete its detailed plan. Considering the high potential risk to 
customers’ data and the high demand for software customization, Firm 3 decided to offer 
a private cloud-based application software solution. Unlike Firm 1, Firm 3 is in a state of 
debt-constrained design capital (high option value and high technical debt). However, 
Firm 3 cannot invest as much in infrastructure and know-how as Firm 1. Investing 
aggressively to acquire necessary infrastructure and know-how, Firm 1 is able to deploy 
multiple software operations for different tenants on a single server, enabling it to offer 
customization while still being able to pursue the cost benefits of multiple tenancy. With 
only limited resources to invest, Firm 3 continues to seek to collaborate with a well-
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known cloud infrastructure provider to offer its customization services through a private 
cloud-based system, thus optimizing rather than innovating in terms of its cloud offering.  
 
The table here outlines the seven building blocks of a cloud strategy and the resultant 
strategies adopted by the three firms in our study. Note there can be other combinations 
of the seven building blocks than those we cover here, nor is it our aim to present all 
possible combinations; for instance, we anticipate having distinct structural 
characteristics (such as a start-up firm without an existing customer base, as in our 
empirical examples) would most likely lead to distinct configurations in our scheme. In 
this respect, any future study that would examine how startup companies strategize their 
cloud-based SaaS offerings according to our framework would complement our findings.  
 
Conclusion  
Our main aim here is to assist researchers and practitioners in utilizing the building 
blocks identified as essential ingredients for analyzing a firm’s cloud strategy. We thus 
provide an overarching framework consisting of seven building blocks encompassing the 
characteristics of the firm’s industry environment, internal digital capabilities, and target 
clients’ requirements for the particular cloud-based offering. These blocks ultimately 
determine how firms embark on a cloud-based SaaS strategy.  
 
While significant challenges exist for firms offering application software through the 
cloud, we find it important to start right and better understand the main building blocks of 
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such an endeavor. Innovation, optimization, and disruptive strategies represent possible 
ways for firms to leverage the cloud to advance their value propositions. It is important to 
highlight we do not advocate any one approach as superior to the others; rather, the 
strategies identified here should be viewed as a viable aftermath of a firm’s industry 
characteristics (turbulence, concentration, and growth), stock of digital capital (option 
value and technical debt), and clients’ requirements for the cloud-based SaaS offering 
(criticality of security optimization and software customization).  
 
References  
1. August, T., Niculescu, M.F., and Shin, H. Cloud implications on software network 
structure and security risks. Information Systems Research 25, 3 (Sept. 2014), 489–510.  
 
2. Bento, A. and Bento, R. Cloud computing: A new phase in information technology 
management. Journal of Information Technology Management 22, 1 (Mar. 2011), 39–46.  
 
3. Berman, S., Kesterson-Townes, L., Marshall, A., and Srivathsa, R. The power of 
cloud: Driving business model innovation. IBM Institute for Business Value, Feb. 2012; 
http://www-935.ibm.com/services/us/gbs/thoughtleadership/ibv-power-of-cloud.html  
 
4. Geetha, M., Kanagamathanmohan, K., and Paul, C. Ranking the cloud services based 
on QoS parameters. International Journal For Technological Research In Engineering 1, 
5 (Jan. 2014), 272–276.  
 
23 
5. Iyer, B. and Henderson, J. Preparing for the future: Understanding the seven 
capabilities of cloud computing. MIS Quarterly Executive 9, 2 (June 2010), 117–131.  
 
6. Mithas, S., Tafti, A., and Mitchell, W. How a firm’s competitive environment and 
digital strategic posture influence digital business strategy. MIS Quarterly 37, 2 (June 
2013), 511–536.  
 
7. Padhy, R. and Patra, M. Managing IT operations in a cloud-driven enterprise: Case 
studies. American Journal of Cloud Computing 1, 1 (Aug. 2013), 1–18.  
 
8. Peters, B. The worst and best enterprise cloud strategies. Forbes (May 21, 2013); 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/bradpeters/2013/05/21/the-worst-and-best-enterprise-cloud-
strategies  
 
9. Shayan, E., Ghotb, F., and Suganda, R. Characterizing diffusion patterns of cloud 
computing. International Journal for Management Science And Technology 1, 9 (Nov. 
2013), 2–15.  
 
10. Vance, A. IBM faces a crisis in the cloud. Bloomberg Businessweek (Nov. 15, 2013); 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-11-15/ibm-faces-a-crisis-in-the-cloud  
 
24 
11. Woodard, C.J., Ramasubbu, N., Tschang, F., and Sambamurthy, V. Design capital 
and design moves: The logic of digital business strategy. MIS Quarterly 23, 2 (June 
2012), 537–564.  
 
Lazaros Goutas (lgoutas@ethz.ch) is a senior researcher and lecturer in information 
systems in the Department of Management, Technology, and Economics at ETH Zurich, 
Zurich, Switzerland.  
 
Juliana Sutanto (j.sutanto@lancaster.ac.uk) is a professor of information systems in the 
Department of Management Science at Lancaster University, Lancaster, U.K.  
 
Hassan Aldarbesti (ahassan@ethz.ch) is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of 
Management, Technology, and Economics at ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland.  
 
pull quotes  
“The question of whether the CRM [software] should be offered in the cloud or not is 
omnipresent.”  
 
We found customers’ requirements involving software security and customization are the 
two main attributes that determine a firm’s decision to change its on-premise software to 
cloud-based SaaS.  
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The cloud is not only a technology that enables businesses to embrace opportunities for 
innovation, it also serves as a catalyst for business-model transformation.  
 
